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LET STOCKHOLDERS DECIDE: THE ORIGINS OF THE
MARYLAND DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
STATUTE OF 1988
James J. Hanks, Jr.t
Larry P. Scrigginst
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988 (the Statute), enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland as emergency legislation
early in the 1988 session and signed by Governor Schaefer on February
18, 1988, arose out of the crisis in the markets for director and officer
(D&O) liability insurance in the mid-1980's. During this period, a combination of factors caused sharp increases in the cost of D&O liability
insurance and led, in many cases, to its unavailability at any price. Contributing to these developments were the surging market for takeovers,
the increasing number of highly visible companies becoming financially
distressed, particularly in the banking and energy industries, and worldwide reduced underwriting capacity in the property and casualty industry. These factors led to an increased demand for coverage by insureds
and an increased perception of risk by insurers, which further decreased
underwriting capacity among insurers. Many carriers left the field altogether, reducing already-limited capacity and further increasing upward
pressure on premiums.'
As the number and size of takeovers and troubled companies rose,
the courts became increasingly willing to second-guess directors' decisions, culminating in the well-known case of Smith v. Van Gorkom. 2 In
that case, the Supreme Court of Delaware held the directors of Trans
Union Corporation liable for damages approaching $50 million for approving a negotiated merger without sufficient information and deliberation, even though the price offered was nearly 50% higher than the
recent market price for Trans Union's stock and even though the investment bankers had been unsuccessful in obtaining a still higher price. 3

t

A.B., 1964, Princeton University; LL.B., 1967, University of Maryland; LL.M.,
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1. For further discussion of the D&O liability insurance market in the mid-1980s, see
JOHNSTON, CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS, IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS IN 1986, § 11.05[1] (J. Moss ed. 1986).
2. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
3. For further discussion of the Trans Union and post-Trans Union cases, see Note,
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Although the court specifically reaffirmed the gross negligence standard
for directors' liability for money damages, 4 at least one trial court in
Maryland has suggested that the ambit of what constitutes gross negligence has expanded. 5
The Van Gorkom decision was widely viewed, especially in the business community and by the insurance industry, as broadening the exposure of directors of corporations to personal liability for money damages.
The fact that significant money damages could be imposed upon corporate directors based upon the facts of the Van Gorkom case led many
directors, insurance companies and others to conclude that establishing
the gross negligence standard was suddenly much easier than prior to
Van Gorkom.
In addition to take over litigation, financially distressed companies
have been another frequent source of litigation against directors and officers. In 1984, insurers paid approximately $25 million to settle stockholder suits alleging mismanagement by former directors and officers of
The Wickes Companies. 6 In Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corp.,7 the Delaware Chancery Court approved a settlement of $32.5 million in a suit
against Chase Manhattan Corporation and six of its officers arising out of
the collapse of Drysdale Government Securities. A few months later,
Seafirst Corp., a bank holding company headquartered in Seattle, and
five of its officers settled a derivative suit for $110 million, 8 although the
company agreed to limit its recovery to the proceeds of the insurance
policies covering the officers. Even doing nothing can be the basis for
liability. A United States court of appeals has held that a director who
acquiesces in a breach of fiduciary duty by another director may be held
jointly and severally liable for the breach. 9 As the Van Gorkom court
noted: "It is, of course, a fact of corporate life that today when faced
with difficult or sensitive issues, directors often are subject to suit, irrespective of the decisions they make." 10
D&O insurance carriers responded to the Van Gorkom decision and
other litigation against directors and officers with sharp increases in the
The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 66 TEx. L.
411, 418-29 (1987).
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
Maryland Deposit Insurance Fund Corp. v. Seidel, No. 13408 (Cir. Ct. Montgomery County, Md. Oct. 7, 1987) ("While gross negligence remains the standard of
directorial culpability in the State, the gateway to that precinct is considerably less
obstructed than might be supposed."); see also Director Roundtable: The D&O Crisis and Board Liability, Directors Boards, at 12 (Summer 1986) (remarks of Bayless
Manning).
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1984, at 6, col. 4.
No. 8192-85 (Del. Dec. 6, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Del. file).
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. SeaFirst Corp., No. C85-396R (W.D. Wash. 1986);
Seafirst Lawsuit Settled, Am. Banker, July 9, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
Thorn v. Reliance Van Co., 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1985). This citation refers to an
unpublished opinion which may be found in LEXIS, Genfed library, USAPP file.
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985).
REV.

4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
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cost of D&O coverage through higher premiums, narrower insuring
clauses, broader exclusions, expanded deductibles and lower policy limits. 11 Some carriers withdrew from the market altogether and some corporations were unable to obtain D&O insurance at any price, increasing
the anxiety of directors about the risks of their positions. It is likely that
directors were also concerned not only about personal liability for money
damages, but also about non-pecuniary costs of litigation such as damage
to reputation, loss of time and distraction from other activities. Consequently, outside directors of many publicly held corporations resigned,
declined to stand for re-election or refused nomination - reversing a
trend toward outside directors encouraged by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange and various
commentators. 12
Surging D&O insurance costs and the resulting difficulty in retaining outside directors quickly led to action by state legislatures. The first
state to respond was Indiana, 13 in April, 1986, followed by Delaware 14 in
June. The enactment of director liability legislation in Delaware caused
many corporations chartered in other states to reincorporate in Delaware.15 Today, more than forty other states have adopted legislation
designed to reduce the risk of directors' personal liability for money
damages. 16
The two most common legislative approaches have been limitations
on the personal liability of directors for money damages and expansion of
the corporation's right to indemnify directors in derivative suits. Statutory limitations on the personal liability of directors for money damages
generally take three approaches: (1) "charter option" statutes (e.g.,
Maryland and Delaware) permitting stockholders to adopt charter provisions limiting the liability of directors; (and, in some states, officers) for
money damages in suits by the corporation or its stockholders; (2) "selfexecuting" statutes (e.g., Indiana) adjusting the standard of conduct giv11. Crown Central Petroleum Corporation, headquartered in Baltimore, reported that
its annual D&O liability insurance premium increased from $13,000 in 1984 to
$1,300,000 in 1987- an increase of 10,000 percent. In addition, the limits of the
policy were reduced from $30,000,000 to $10,000,000. Hanks, The Risk of Running
a Company, The Baltimore Sun, May I, 1987, at llA, col. l.
12. E.g., Corp. Officers & Directors Liability Litigation Rep. (Andrews) at 2,102 (Dec.
10, 1986); Baum & Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1986, at 56;
N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1986, at Dl, col. 3.
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-l(e) (Burns Supp. 1988).
14. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). For further discussion of the
Delaware statute, see Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors with
a Three-Legged Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification and Insurance, 42 Bus.
LAW. 399 (1987).
15. E.g., BancTec, Inc. (Tex.), Clorox Co. (Cal.), Genentech, Inc. (Cal.), Environmental Diagnostics, Inc. (Cal.), Microsoft Corp. (Wash.), Penn Central Corp. (Pa.),
Hechinger Co. (D.C.) and Walt Disney Co. (Cal.).
16. For a survey of this legislation, see Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on
Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnfication, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207
(1988).

238

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 18

ing rise to liability for money damages in suits by the corporation or the
stockholders (and, in some states, third parties); and (3) in Virginia only,
a statutory cap on the liability of directors and officers for money damages to the corporation or stockholders.J7 All three approaches exempt
certain conduct from exculpation.
In addition, many states, including Maryland, simultaneously
amended their indemnification statutes, broadening the corporation's
right to indemnify its directors and officers.
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The standard of conduct for directors of Maryland corporations is
set forth in section 2-405.1(a) of the Maryland General Corporation Law
(MGCL), 18 enacted in 1976. The statute requires that a director perform
his duties:
(1) In good faith;
(2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
fnterest of the corporation; and
(3) With the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would use under similar circumstances. 19
Prior to 1988, section 2-405.1(c) provided:
A person who performs his duties in accordance with the standard provided in this section has no liability by reason of being
or having been a director of a corporation, unless, in a situation
to which § 2-419(d) [relating to interested director transactions] of this subtitle applies, a contract or transaction is determined not to have been fair and reasonable to the
corporation. 20
In cases decided both before and after the enactment of section 2-405.1,
Maryland courts have held that the standard for personal liability of directors of Maryland corporations for money damages is apparently
"gross or culpable negligence." 21 Inexplicably, the court of appeals has
17. VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-692.1 (Supp. 1988).
18. All statutory references hereafter, except as noted, refer to the MGCL section.
19. Section 2-405.l(a) was based upon section 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act. The official comment to section 8.30(a) states that section 8.30(a) "does
not use the term 'fiduciary' ... because that term could be confused with the unique
attributes and obligations of a fiduciary imposed by the Jaw of trusts, some of which
are not appropriate for directors of a corporation." REv. MoDEL BusiNESS CORP.
AcT § 8.30(a) official comment (1984).
20. Section 2-405.1.
21. Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 32, 284 A.2d 605, 612 (1971); Parish v. Maryland
& Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 242 A.2d 512, 540 (1968); Mountain
Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185, 194, 461 A.2d 45, 51 (1983). A
bridge between the provisions of section 2-405.1 (including section 2-405.l(c), both
before and after the 1988 amendments) and the judicial "gross and/or culpable negligence" standard may be supported, albeit indirectly, by the application of the busi-
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referred both to "gross and culpable" negligence anq to "gross or culpable" negligence. 22

A.

The 1987 Bill

In June, 1986, the Subcommittee on Director Liability of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of Corporations, Banking and
Business Law (now the Section of Business Law) of the Maryland State
Bar Association (MSBA Subcommittee) was appointed to consider director liability legislation for Maryland. 23 The MSBA Subcommittee met
frequently throughout the summer and early fall of 1986 and reviewed
the Indiana and Delaware statutes as well as legislation in other states.
In November, 1986, the MSBA Subcommittee issued a report 24 proposing a "self-executing" statute, based on the Indiana statute. Early in
1987 the MSBA Subcommittee's recommended legislation was introduced in the Senate of Maryland as Senate Bill 223, 25 sponsored by Senate President Thomas V. Mike Miller, Jr. as an administration bill, and
in the House of Delegates as House Bill 242, sponsored by House Judiciary Committee Chairman William S. Horne. The two bills are hereafter
referred to collectively as the "1987 Bill."
The 1987 Bill provided that, in order for a director to be liable for
damages, his action or failure to act must constitute:
1. A breach of the standard of conduct set forth in section
2-405.1(a), if applicable, constituting "willful misconduct or deliberate recklessness;"
2. Actual receipt of "an improper benefit in money, property or services;"
3. Assent to declaration of a dividend or distribution contrary to the provisions of the MGCL; or
4. "Willful misconduct or recklessness" in any case to
which section 2-405.1 does not apply. 26

22.
23.
24.

25.
26.

ness judgment rule presumption. The official comment to section 8.30 of the
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, on which section 2-405.1 was based,
makes it clear that, if the standard of section 8.30(a) is met, the director is exonerated and there is no need to consider possible application of the business judgment
rule; if that standard is not met, then consideration of the business judgment rule
comes into play and may protect the director.
Parish, 250 Md. at 74-76, 242 A.2d at 540-41 (emphasis added); see also Parish v.
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 261 Md. 618, 681, 277 A.2d 19, 48, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
The members of the subcommittee were Arthur F. Fergenson, James J. Hanks, Jr.
(Chairman), Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Larry P. Scriggins, J. W. Thompson Webb
and John J. Woloszyn.
See MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N, SECTION ON CORP., BANKING AND Bus. L.,
COMM. ON CORP. LAW, SUBCOMM. ON DIRECTOR LIABILITY REP. (Nov. 16, 1987)
[hereinafter DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT) reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 254
(1989) ("Appendix" to this article).
S.B. 223, 1987 Sess. (1987)
/d.
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The 1987 Bill's limitation of liability was "self-executing" in the sense
that it applied automatically to directors of all Maryland corporations
without any requirement of the stockholders' approval. It also applied to
all suits for damages, whether by the corporation, the stockholders (directly or derivatively) or third parties.
The MSBA Subcommittee found that a self-executing standard of
"willful misconduct or deliberate recklessness" was desirable for several
reasons. First, it added greater clarity and certainty to the law than is
available under judicial precedents. Second, it followed self-executing director liability statutes already enacted in Indiana and Louisiana, thereby
enabling Maryland courts to take advantage of cases decided in those
states under this standard. Third, it tended to discourage directors of
Maryland-chartered corporations from recommending reincorporation
in other states because it assured directors that they would not be held
personally liable for money damages for simple negligence. Fourth,
newly established businesses, perceiving Maryland as having an up-todate corporation statute, would be more likely to incorporate here. Fifth,
a self-executing statute would add to the perception of Maryland as a
state with a favorable and responsive business climate. Finally, it would
encourage directors of Maryland-chartered corporations to continue
serving as directors.27
Section 2-405.2(b) of the 1987 Bill gave the corporation the right to
opt out of the self-executing provision of section 2-405.2(a), except for
liability arising out of (1) actual receipt of "an improper benefit in
money, property or services" or (2) a judgment establishing "active and
deliberate dishonesty [that] was material to the cause of action so
adjudicated .... "
The self-executing revised liability provision was set forth as a proposed new section 2-405.2 in order to eliminate any argument that, by its
inclusion in section 2-405.1, the statutory limitation on liability was intended to apply only to a director's breach of the standard of care set
forth in section 2-405.1(a) and not also to a breach of the duty of loyalty
or some other duty. The words "willful" and "deliberate" were intended
to indicate a requirement of specific intent to cause harm, as opposed to a
general intent to perform the acts or omissions giving rise to the injury.
The 1987 Bill also added a new section 2-105(b)(8) authorizing the
charter of a Maryland corporation to contain a provision "which varies
in accordance with § 2-405.2(b) of this title the standards for liability of
the directors of a corporation for money damages." Thus, even though
proposed section 2-405.2 was self-executing, a corporation could opt out
of it by including a provision in the original articles of incorporation or
by amending its charter. The 1987 Bill also deleted the reference to in27. For a discussion of the rationale for the self-executing Wisconsin director liability
statute by one of its drafters, see Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legislation on
Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207,
1234 n.68 (1988).
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terested-director transactions in the liability limiting provision of section
2-405.1(c).
Along with the proposed amendment relating to the standard for
director's liability for money damages, the 1987 Bill contained four
amendments to section 2-418 relating to indemnification:
1.

Presumption of Non-Compliance With Indemnification Standard

Section 2-418(b)(3) previously provided that termination of any proceeding by a judgment, order, settlement, conviction or a nolo contendere
plea created a rebuttable presumption that the director did not meet the
requisite standard for indemnification set forth in section 2-418(b)(1).2 8
The Subcommittee recommended that, as to convictions and nolo contendere pleas, the rebuttable presumption should continue, but that as to
judgments, orders and settlements, there should be no presumption one
way or the other.
2.

Non-Exclusivity

Under prior section 2-418(g), any contract between a corporation
and its directors providing for indemnification was required to be "consistent with" the indemnification permitted by section 2-418. In the 1987
Bill, however, section 2-418(g) provided that any statutory indemnification "shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights, by indemnification or otherwise, to which a director may be entitled under the charter,
the bylaws, a resolution of stockholders or directors, an agreement or
otherwise .... "
3.

Advance Payment of Expenses

Prior section 2-418(f) required, as a prerequisite to advance payment of expenses during the pendency of a proceeding to which a director was a party, a determination in each case that indemnification would
not be precluded under the facts known at the time of the determination.
The 1987 Bill eliminated the necessity for this determination and authorized a corporation to adopt a general provision for advance payment of
expenses in its charter, or bylaws or by contract.
28. Prior to 1988, section 2-418(b)( 1) permitted a corporation to indemnify a director if
he:
(i) Acted in good faith;
(ii) Reasonably believed:
1. In the case of conduct in the director's official capacity with the corporation,
that the conduct was in the best interests of the corporation; and
2. In all other cases, that the conduct was at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation; and
(iii) In the case of any criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe that
the conduct was unlawful.

242
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Determination of Permissibility of Indemnification

Section 2-418(e) formerly provided that indemnification must be
"authorized in a specific case .... " The 1987 Bill proposed substituting
the words "for a specific proceeding" for the words "in the specific case."
In the Senate, Senate Bill 223 was assigned to the Judicial Proceedings Committee (Senate Committee), which held a hearing on February
4, 1987, at which representatives of the MSBA and various business organizations testified in support of the bill. Following the hearing, the
Senate Committee made five amendments to the bill.
First, the "willful misconduct or deliberate recklessness" standard
was eliminated in favor of "a standard of misconduct or recklessness
amounting to gross negligence." This amendment effectively eviscerated
the bill. Indeed, it would have made liability for money damages even
easier to prove than under the "gross or culpable negligence" standard
adopted by the Maryland courts. 29 Second, the Senate Committee added
an exception to the bill for actions brought against directors of a stateregulated savings and loan association or credit union that did not have
federal insurance of accounts. Third, the Senate Committee also
amended the bill to continue the presumption of non-compliance with
the statutory standards for indemnification in the case of a conviction or
a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent. Fourth, the Senate Committee
amended the non-exclusivity provision of section 2-418(g). Finally, the
Senate Committee added an effective date provision providing that the
liability limitation provisions would apply "only to actions arising from
events or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this Act"
and that the amendments to section 2-418 would "apply only to indemnification granted on or after the effective date of this Act, whether the
underlying events, omissions, or proceedings occurred prior or subsequent thereto."
Meanwhile, in the House of Delegates, House Bill 242 was assigned
to the Judiciary Committee (House Committee) which held a hearing on
February 17, 1987, at which representatives of the MSBA and the business community testified in support of the bill. Only the Maryland Trial
Lawyers Association opposed it. Members of the House Committee expressed concern that the bill was "self-executing" and denied stockholders the opportunity to participate in the decision whether or not to limit
directors' liability. Members also stated reservations about the application of the bill to suits by third parties. Following the hearing, the House
Committee gave House Bill 242 an unfavorable report. On March 5,
1987, the Senate passed Senate Bill223 but when it was introduced in the
House of Delegates and referred to the House Committee, it too received
an unfavorable report.
The reaction of the business community and the press to the House
Committee's action was strongly negative. Henry A. Rosenberg, Jr.,
29. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of Crown Central
Petroleum Corporation, told the annual meeting of stockholders that
management was "seriously considering" reincorporating in Delaware if
the legislature did not pass director liability legislation in the 1988 session.30 Donald P. Hutchinson, a former member of both the House of
Delegates and the Senate, and President of Maryland Economic Growth
Associates, Inc., representing over 75 major corporations, stated that
many companies were "disenchanted [that] the legislature failed to recognize the problem but most are saying they are willing to give the legislature another chance to deal with the issue." 31 Jerome W. Geckle,
Chairman of the Board of PHH Group, Inc., said that he would "be
forced to take a hard look elsewhere" if the General Assembly did not
pass adequate legislation. 32 The Baltimore Sun added its voice on May
12 with an editorial entitled "Stop the Move to Delaware!" stating that it
was "encouraging to learn that members of the House Judiciary Committee are having second thoughts about their earlier decision to kill legislation that would have reformed Maryland corporate directors' liability
law. . . . The sooner this bill is enacted, the better." 33

B.

The 1988 Bill

In late May, following the adjournment of the General Assembly,
the chairman of the MSBA Subcommittee met with Chairman Horne of
the House Committee and with Committee Counsel Douglas Nestor.
Chairman Horne reiterated his committee's concern over the stockholder
participation and third-party issues. He was told that the MSBA Subcommittee was willing to redraft the 1987 Bill to require any liabilitylimitation provision to be included in the corporation's charter (either as
part of the original articles of incorporation or by amendment approved
by the stockholders), and to eliminate limitation of liability in suits by
third parties. Chairman Home was also informed that the MSBA Subcommittee wished to include officers as a protected group in any new bill.
These and other issues were discussed at a hearing of the House
Committee on June 2, 1987. Alan M. Rifkin, then Chief Legislative Officer to Governor Schaefer, and other representatives of the Schaefer Administration, the business community and the MSBA testified in support
of the revised liability-limitation legislation. Most of the discussion focused on the need for stockholder approval, the standard of liability,
third-party suits, officers and standard of proof. Chairman Home and
other legislators who had voted against House Bill 242 expressed support
for new legislation requiring stockholder approval and eliminating liability limitation for third-party suits.
30. The Baltimore Sun, May 3, 1987, at 5F, col. 1.
31. /d., col. 2; see also Washington Business, Washington Post, May 4, 1987, at 38, col.
3.
32. The Baltimore Sun, May 3, 1987, at 5F, cols. 2-3.
33. The Baltimore Sun, May 12, 1987, at lOA, col. 1.
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In the succeeding months, the MSBA Subcommittee prepared a new
report 34 recommending a modified bill (the 1988 Bill) with five principal
changes from the 1987 Bill. First, any provision for limitation of liability
must be included in the corporation's charter (the charter option). This
revision reflected the concern of the House Committee that liability limitation should not be self-executing. Second, liability limitation for third
party suits was eliminated because third parties do not participate in the
liability limitation decision and, therefore, should not be precluded from
recovery. Third, officers were included along with directors as a protected group. Fourth, the scope of possible liability limitation was expanded to include any conduct except (1) actual receipt of an improper
benefit in money, property or services and (2) active and deliberate dishonesty established by an adjudication to be material to the cause of action adjudicated. Finally, the standard of permissible indemnification
under section 2-418(b)(1) was broadened. Thus, the MSBA Subcommittee acceded to the House Committee's disapproval of self-executing liability limitation and inclusion of third-party suits in exchange for
inclusion of officers as a protected group, a broader standard of possible
liability limitation and a broader standard for permissible indemnification. The 1988 Bill also excluded suits brought by the State of Maryland
or by a receiver, conservator or depositor against a director or officer of
state-chartered banks, credit unions or savings and loan associations and
their subsidiaries. National banks and bank holding companies were not
included in the exception.
In October, the House Committee held a work session on the 1988
Bill at which MSBA and business community representatives testified.
By this time, however, several Maryland corporations had reincorporated in other states. 35
The 1988 Bill was introduced as an emergency measure in the
House as House Bill 273, sponsored by House Speaker R. Clayton
Mitchell, Jr. as an administration bill, and in the Senate as Senate Bill
223, sponsored by Senate President Miller as an administration bill.
House Bill 273 was referred to the House Committee, which held a
hearing on January 19, 1988. Representatives of the Schaefer Administration, the MSBA, the Maryland Chamber of Commerce, Maryland
Economic Growth Associates, Inc., the Greater Baltimore Committee,
the Greater Washington Board of Trade and other organizations testified
in favor of the bill. Again, the only testimony in opposition came from
the Maryland Trial Lawyers Association. Two days later, The Baltimore
Sun weighed in with an editorial recommending "a ringing endorsement" by the House Committee. 36
On January 26, 1988, the House Committee rejected an amendment
34. See DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 24, at 254-55.
35. E.g., Fairchild Industries, Inc., Luskin's, Inc., McKesson Corp. and Penta Systems
International, Inc.
36. Editorial, Spotlight on Judiciary, The Baltimore Sun, Jan. 21, 1988, lOA, col. l.
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to substitute the exceptions in the Delaware statute for the improper benefit and active and deliberate dishonesty exceptions in House Bill 273.
The House Committee also rejected an amendment to delete officers from
the bill. The House Committee then gave House Bill 273 a favorable
report, without amendments, by a margin of twenty-one yeas, no nays
and one abstention. Two days later, the House of Delegates overwhelmingly rejected the same two amendments rejected by the House Committee and gave final approval, without amendments, to House Bill 273 by a
margin of 121 yeas, 1 nay and 19 not voting. On February 18, the Senate
approved House Bill 273 by a vote of forty-four yeas, one nay and two
not voting.
In the Senate, Senate Bill 223 was referred to the Senate Committee,
which held a hearing on January 26, 1988 at which representatives of the
Schaefer Administration and many of the same organizations that appeared before the House Committee testified in support of Senate Bill
223. There was no opposing testimony. On January 29, the Senate Committee gave Senate Bill 223 a favorable report, without amendments, by a
margin of ten yeas, no nays and one absent. On February 4, the Senate
gave final approval, without amendments, to Senate Bill 223 by a margin
of thirty-eight yeas, three nays, five excused and one not voting. The
House of Delegates approved Senate Bill 223 on February 18 by a vote of
109 yeas, 6 nays, 1 excused and 25 not voting.
As an emergency bill, the legislation became law on February 18,
1988, the date it was signed by Governor Schaefer, 37 who cited the statute as "a good example of success through cooperation" between the Administration and the General Assembly. 38
According to uncodified section 2 of the Statute, the liability-limitation provisions "apply only to actions arising from events or omissions
occurring on or after" February 18, 1988. Thus, even though a liabilitylimitation charter amendment may not have any effect on events or omissions occurring prior to the February 18, 1988 enactment date, the Statute permits the exculpatory provisions, after stockholder adoption and
upon filing and acceptance for record of articles of amendment, to relate
back to events or omissions occurring on or after February 18, 1988.
The indemnification provisions, which do not require stockholder action,
may "apply only to indemnification granted on or after" February 18,
1988, without regard to when the underlying events or omissions
occurred.

37. 1988 Md. Laws chs. 3, 4. The governor signed both H. B. 273 (which became chapter 3) and S.B. 223 (which became chapter 4); the bills were identical. Chapter 3 is
reprinted as Addendum I to the Appendix of this article.
38. The Sun, Feb. 19, 1988, at IF, col. 6.
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OPERATION AND EFFECT

Liability Limitation

The liability-limitation provisions of the Statute are, like the statutes
in Delaware and thirty other states, a "charter option" law. The Statute
does nothing more than authorize the corporation, either in its original
articles of incorporation or by charter amendment, to limit the liability of
its directors and officers for money damages, with certain exceptions, in
suits by the corporation or its stockholders, but not in suits brought by
third parties. In a sense, the Statute is not a major expansion of the
stockholders' authority. Section 2-104(b)(l) of the MGCL, like most
state corporation statutes, 39 authorizes the charter to include "[a]ny provision not inconsistent with law which defines, limits, or regulates the
powers of the corporation, its directors and stockholders .... " If it were
not for the fact that "law" probably includes judicial decisions permitting
recovery of money damages upon a showing of gross and culpable negligence40 (and also that section 2-104(b)(l) does not refer to "liabilities" of
directors or officers), the liability of directors and officers could probably
be limited under existing section 2-104(b)(1) and the Statute would be
unnecessary. Moreover, other provisions of the MGCL empower the
stockholders to elect and remove directors, 41 approve mergers and other
major corporate transactions42 and dissolve the corporation. 43 All of
these actions are far more common than suits by the corporation or its
stockholders against directors and typically involve immediate eco11omic
consequences to the stockholders far greater than limiting the directors'
or officers' liability. Thus, in authorizing the stockholders to limit the
monetary liability of directors and officers to the corporation and the
stockholders, the Statute is only a minimal expansion of the stockholders' existing powers.
In any event, without affirmative action by the corporation, the Statute will have no effect on the directors' or officers' monetary liability.
Moreover, the liability limitation provisions of the Statute have no effect
on the liability of directors or officers for equitable relief or on the right
of the stockholders to remove directors44 or the right of directors to remove officers. 45
1.

Scope of Liability Limitation

The exceptions to the Maryland charter option Statute in effect define the scope of the stockholders' right to limit the monetary liability of
39. E.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 2.02(b)(2) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b)(1) (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 402(c) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
40. See supra note 21.
41. Section 2-406 (1985).
42. !d. §§ 3-101 to 3-105 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
43. !d. §§ 3-401 to 3-403, 3-413 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
44. !d. § 2-406 ( 1985).
45. !d. § 2-413(c).
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the corporation's directors and officers from the corporation or its stockholders. The ambiguity of some of the Delaware exceptions (especially
breach of the duty of loyalty, 46 acts or omissions not in good faith, and
improper personal benefit) caused concern that they could be interpreted
so broadly as to defeat the purpose of the Statute. Although many states
have simply copied the Delaware statute in its entirety, including its exceptions, several of the more recent charter option states, now including
Maryland, have adopted more targeted exceptions.
As a result of the Maryland Statute's two very limited exceptions for
improper personal benefit or profit and for active and deliberate dishonesty, stockholders of a Maryland corporation may eliminate the liability
of its directors and officers for a broad range of conduct - including not
only simple and gross negligence, but also intentional misconduct, bad
faith, unlawful distributions, 47 and violations of law- as long as it does
not constitute actual receipt of an improper benefit or profit, or active
and deliberate dishonesty. The two most important favorable differences
between the exceptions in the Maryland and Delaware statutes are Maryland's limitation of the exception for improper receipt of a personal benefit to its actual value, i.e., restitution, and Maryland's absence of a "duty
of loyalty" exception. The narrowness and precision of the Maryland
Statute's two exceptions make it possibly the most expansive corporate
liability limitation statute in the nation.
The Statute permits the stockholders to adjust the limitation of liability to themselves or the corporation to whatever degree they wish.
Although stockholders of many corporations will want to take full advantage of the Statute, some corporations' stockholders may decide, for
example, to limit liability only for directors and not officers, or only for
gross negligence, or only up to a certain monetary amount, or only above
a certain monetary amount, or only for suits by or in the right of the
corporation and not for direct suits by stockholders. Indeed, the Statute
permits the stockholders to expand the standard of liability, of directors
and officers as previously established by judicial decisions. For example,
46. The Delaware Supreme Court itself has had difficulty distinguishing the duty of care
from the duty of loyalty. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 175 (trial court held that "the Revlon directors had breached their
duty of care"); id. at 179 (trial court held that "the Revlon directors had breached
their duty of loyalty") (Del. 1986). In fact, the trial court held that "the Revlon
Board failed in its fiduciary duty to the shareholders. . . . [I]ts performance did not
conform to the other component of the business judgment rule - the duty of loyalty." MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250
(Del. Ch. 1985). For further discussion of the Rev/on case, see McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CORP. LAW 205, 287 (1988); see also Fischel &
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CoRNELL L. REV. 261, 291 (1986).
47. In response to a question from Senator Norman R. Stone (D- Baltimore Co.) during a work session of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee in February, 1988,
on amendments to title 2, subtitle 3 of the MGCL, MSBA representatives stated
that liability for unlawful distributions under new section 2-312 could be limited by
a charter amendment adopted by a corporation pursuant to the Statute.
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the Statute permits stockholders to hold directors monetarily liable for
simple negligence. Contrary to Professor Sargent's suggestion in an accompanying article, 48 the Statute does not "diminish[ ] ... the value of
the traditional distinction between [the duties of] care and loyalty .... "
These duties will continue to be developed in suits by third parties, in
suits by stockholders of corporations not adopting liability limitation
provisions, in suits for equitable relief49 and in suits against directors and
officers of state-chartered financial institutions excluded from the Statute.
Finally, the Statute amended section 2-405.1(c) to eliminate its inapposite reference to section 2-419. Section 2-419 provides a procedure for
insulating transactions between a corporation and a director from voidness or voidability and from recovery of damages from the director; it
does not, however, provide for personal liability for directors. 50 Moreover, the issue addressed by section 2-419 relates to the duty of loyalty,
whereas section 2-405.1 deals primarily with the duty of care. Accordingly, the reference to section 2-419 in section 2-405.l(c) was never appropriate and was therefore deleted by the Statute. 51 Thus, even if a
corporation does not adopt a liability limitation charter provision (or
adopts only a partial provision), section 2-405.1(c) will protect a director,
but not necessarily an officer, from liability, both for money damages as
well as equitable relief, if he performs his duties in accordance with the
three-part standard of section 2-405.1(a). In addition, the director would
have the benefit of the presumption of the business judgment rule, as
indicated in the official comment to section 8.30(d) of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, 52 on which section 2-405.1(c) was based.
2.

Officers

Five states, including Maryland, now permit stockholders to limit
the liability of officers. Since a charter option statute gives the stockholders the right to limit liability there is no logical policy reason for permit48. See Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Directors' and Officers' Liability Statute,
18 U. BALT. L. REV. 278, 300 (1989).
49. In litigation testing the sufficiency of the deliberative process and the adequacy of
price and other terms in takeovers, the most common and effective remedy is typically an injunction or writ of mandamus, not money damages.
SO. The court of special appeals in Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md.
App. 185, 195, 198, 461 A.2d 45, 51, 53 (1983), speaks confusingly about "violation" of section 2-419. In fact, section 2-419 cannot be "violated." It is a safe harbor both from voidness or voidability and from any liability to a director arising out
of being a party to a contract or transaction with the corporation. The fact that a
contract or other transaction does not meet the standards of section 2-419 does not
mean that it is void, voidable, invalid or unenforceable; it means only that the contract or transaction does not enjoy the statutory insulation from voidness or
voidability. There may be other facts or circumstances that would shield it from
voidness or voidability.
5 l. Section 8.30(b) of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the counterpart to
section 2-40S.l(c), contains no similar reference to the Model Act counterpart of
section 2-419.
52. REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8.30(d) official comment (1984).
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ting them to limit the liability of directors but not officers. Moreover, if
plaintiffs are foreclosed only from suing directors, they will be increasingly motivated to sue officers, particularly senior officers, in order to
reach the D&O liability insurance policy. D&O insurers are more likely
to reduce their premiums if they are assured that the liability of both
directors and officers is limited. Furthermore, treating directors and officers alike for purposes of liability limitation is consistent with the identical treatment of directors and officers under Maryland's
indemnification statute. 53 Finally, many of the matters typically submitted to a board of directors originate among the officers and, if approved
by the directors, are referred to the officers for implementation. They are
entitled, if the stockholders so decide, to be protected to the same degree
as directors.

B.

Indemnification.

The Statute makes several amendments to the indemnification provisions of section 2-418.
1.

Scope of Indemnification

Formerly, section 2-418(b)(1) set forth the "good faith," "reasonable belief" standard for the right of a corporation to indemnify its directors and officers. 54 The Statute amends section 2-418(b)(1) to permit a
corporation to indemnify a director unless it is "proved" that the individual (1) acted "in bad faith" or with "active and deliberate dishonesty;"
(2) "actually received an improper personal benefit in money, property or
services;" or (3) "[i]n the case of any criminal proceeding, had reasonable
cause to believe that [his] act or omission was unlawful." 55 Thus, the
requirement in section 2-418(e)(1) for a determination that the director
"has met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (b)" is initially
satisfied simply by a determination that it has not yet been proved that
the director's conduct fell within any of the three exceptions. Of course,
if the proceeding eventually results in a determination that the director's
conduct did fall within one of the three exceptions, then the director
would be required, by the written undertaking required by section 2418(f)(1)(ii), to repay any expenses advanced during the course of the
proceeding. The inclusion of the word "personal" in the phrase "improper personal benefit" in section 2-418(b)(l)(ii), as opposed to the
phrase "improper benefit or profit" in new section 2-405.2(a)(l), was not
intended to have any substantive significance. The words "or profit" in
53. Section 2-418(j)(l) (1985).
54. Supra note 28.
55. In 1989, the General Assembly amended section 2-418(b)(l) again, by substituting
the word "established" for the word "proved" and the words "matter giving rise to"
for the words "cause of action adjudicated in." The purpose of this amendment is
to clarify that section 2-418(e)(l) applies to settlements as well as to adjudicated
causes of action.
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section 2-405.2(a)(1) were added to the 1988 Bill at the request of the
Attorney General's Office; no request was made to include these words in
section 2-418(b)( 1)(ii).
Because of the "bad faith" exception, the corporation's right to indemnify its directors and officers is slightly less expansive than the right
of stockholders to limit their liability. This is appropriate in view of the
fact that the corporation may indemnify directors and officers by board
action without the participation of stockholders, whereas liability limitation may be achieved only by stockholder action.
The Statute also expands the scope of indemnification in derivative
suits. Section 2-418(b)(2)(ii) formerly provided that indemnification in a
derivative suit may be made only for reasonable expenses, but not if the
individual was adjudged to be liable to the corporation (unless ordered by
a court). The new Statute permits indemnification for amounts paid in
settlement of derivative suits. This change should encourage settlements
by no longer limiting indemnification to expenses.
2.

Presumption of Noncompliance with Indemnification Standard

Prior to the passage of the D&O statute, Maryland was the only
state that provided that termination of a proceeding by judgment, order,
settlement, or conviction created a rebuttable presumption that the director or officer did not meet the standard for indemnification in section 2418(b)(l). Consistent with the indemnification provisions of more than
forty states, the Statute now provides that a judgment, order or settlement does not create a presumption of non-compliance. A proceeding
may be settled for many reasons having nothing to do with whether the
director's conduct met the standard for indemnification. For example, a
suit may be settled for its "nuisance" value at an amount that is less than
the cost of litigation. There is no reason why a settlement should create a
presumption that the director did not meet the standard for indemnification in section 2-418(b)(l). Even a judgment adverse to the director may
be entered for reasons other than his conduct as a director. Nonetheless,
a conviction or nolo contendere plea continues to create the presumption.
3.

Determination of Permissibility of Indemnification

Prior to the 1988 amendment, section 2-418(e) provided that indemnification must be "authorized in the specific case.... " The word "case"
was never defined in the statute. Its use, especially in view of the definition of "proceeding," raised the question of whether indemnification for
each payment of expenses must be separately authorized. Substituting
the phrase "for a specific proceeding" for the phrase "in the specific
case" resolves any question.
4.

Advance Payment of Expenses

As a condition to advance payment of expenses, section 2-418(f)(l)
formerly required a determination that indemnification would not be pre-
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eluded under the facts known at the time of the determination. This
requirement has been eliminated. Instead, section 2-418(f)(3) now permits a corporation to make general provision for advance payment of
expenses in its charter or bylaws, by contract or in the manner specified
in section 2-418(e).
5.

Non-Exclusivity

Section 2-418(g) previously required that any contract between a
corporation and the director or officer providing for indemnification
must be "consistent with" the indemnification permitted by section 2418. This provision, patterned after section 8.58(a) of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, was much more restrictive than the comparable provision in section 145(f) of the Delaware General Corporation
Law, which provides that the indemnification provided by statute "shall
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those seeking indemnification may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, ... or otherwise.... " Even the Delaware statute, however, could be read to limit
any indemnification right (as opposed to "other right") to section 145.
Section 2-418(g), as amended by the Statute, now makes clear that
section 2-418 does not preclude "other rights," by indemnification or
otherwise, to which a director or officer may be entitled. Of course, the
"other rights" would be limited by public policy considerations. Public
policy would, however, probably be interpreted at least as broadly as the
indemnification now permitted by section 2-418(b) and possibly as
broadly as the limitation of liability now authorized by section 2405.2(a). The phrase "those seeking indemnification" appearing in section 145(f) of the Delaware statute has been replaced with the words "a
director" in order to clarify that a person need not seek indemnification
in order to have the benefit of the new non-exclusivity provision of section 2-418(g).
6.

Alternative Sources of Reimbursement

Finally, the Statute expands section 2-418(k) to specifically authorize a corporation to provide sources of reimbursement other than conventional insurance, including a trust fund, letter of credit, surety bond
or insurance issued by a captive subsidiary. This provision was not contained in the 1987 Bill.
IV.

PROSPECTS

The result of the Van Gorkom case, in Maryland as elsewhere, has
been that the deliberative processes of many boards of directors have
been strengthened through more information for the directors and better
documentation of board actions. 56 This development is-entirely consis56. For some helpful suggestions in this regard, see Manning, Reflections and Practical
Tips on Life in the Boardroom after Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 5 (1985).
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tent with the recognition that the duty of directors should not be measured by the results of their decisions but by the process by which their
decisions are made.57 As one court has recognized, "after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.
The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call
for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information." 58
The immediate benefit of the Statute has been to encourage competent,
qualified, experienced men and women to continue to serve as directors
of Maryland corporations. Enactment of the Statute surely also kept
many Maryland corporations from reincorporating elsewhere.
Directors are not likely to act much differently after the adoption of
a liability-limitation charter provision under new section 2-405.2 than
they acted before the statute. They are unlikely to view liability limitation as a carte blanche for self-dealing, inattention or other mischief simply because they are now less exposed to suits for money damages by the
corporation or stockholders. They know that they can still be sued by
third parties or for equitable relief. Most directors, like most men and
women, do not enjoy the litigation process even when their own assets
are not at risk.
V.

CLOSING

The General Assembly, by enacting the Statute, has reaffirmed the
broad right of stockholders to decide for themselves the allocation of the
economic risk of directors' or officers' misconduct. Indeed, Maryland
corporations moved quickly to take advantage of the liability-limitation
provisions of the Statute. Because the legislation was signed by the governor on February 18, 1988, many calendar year corporations were able
to include liability limitation proposals in the proxy statements for their
annual meetings of stockholders in 1988. 59 In all cases, the stockholders
57. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see also A. BERLE & G. MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 203 (1968) ("After the
fact, where the result has been catastrophic, juries are more likely to err on the side
of the severe than on the lenient side in dealing with the director attacked.") (Footnote omitted).
58. See Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of the Duty of Due Care and
the Business Judgment Rule, A Commentary, 41 Bus. LAw. 1237, 1239 (1986); see
also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8.30 Official Comment (1984): section 8.30 "sets forth the standard by focusing on the manner in which the director
performs his duties, not the correctness of his decisions."
59. Among the Maryland-chartered publicly-owned corporations whose stockholders
have approved liability-limitation charter amendments are Alex. Brown Inc., Alexander & Alexander Services Inc., The Black & Decker Corp., Crown Central Petroleum Corp., Equitable Bancorp., First Maryland Bancorp., Legg Mason, Inc.,
McCormick & Company, Inc., McDonnell Douglas Corp., NCR Corp., Martin
Marietta Corporation, PHH Corp., T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. and USF&G
Corp.
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approved the limitation of liability of both directors and officers to the
fullest extent permitted by the Statute.
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APPENDIX
MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF CORPORATIONS, BANKING AND
BUSINESS LAW
Committee on Corporate Laws
Subcommittee on Director Liability
Report
The undersigned Subcommittee was appointed in June, 1986, to
consider the crisis in directors' and officers' liability insurance and related legislative activity in other states with a view to recommending legislation for consideration by the General Assembly of Maryland.
Following extensive research and numerous meetings during the summer
and early fall of 1986, the Subcommittee issued a Report unanimously
recommending the introduction and passage of legislation which would
(a) clearly define the standard required to impose money damages against
directors of Maryland corporations and (b) modify the current Maryland
indemnification provisions to eliminate unwarranted restrictions and procedural complexities. See Maryland State Bar Association, Section on
Corporations, Banking and Business Law, Committee on Corporate
Laws, Subcommittee on Director Liability, Report (Nov. 5, 1986). The
proposed bill's provision concerning the standard required to impose
money damages against directors of Maryland corporations was completely self-executing, i.e., it applied directly to all Maryland corporations without the necessity of stockholder approval.
The proposed bill was introduced in 1987 in the Senate of Maryland
as S.B. 223 and in the House of Delegates as H.B. 242. Both bills were
strongly supported by Governor Schaefer and his Administration. S.B.
223 was approved, with amendments, by the Judicial Proceedings Committee in the Senate and was passed by the Senate and sent to the House
of Delegates, where it was referred to the Judiciary Committee, which
rejected both H.B. 242 and S.B. 223. There were indications by members
of the Committee that they were concerned about the facts that (1) both
bills would have limited the liability of director in suits by third parties as
well as in suits by the corporation or by its stockholders and (2) no provision was made for approval by the stockholders of limitation of liability
of the directors.
Following the conclusion of the 1987 session of the General Assembly, the Chairman and certain members of the House Judiciary Committee, some of whom had opposed the 1987 bills, indicated that they would
support revised legislation on the subject. T_he Committee held a hearing
on June 2, to consider new legislation. Representatives of the Schaefer
Administration, the business community and this Subcommittee testified
in support of legislation addressing the issue.
Following the hearing, the Subcommittee submitted a revised bill,
drawing on statutes enacted in Delaware and other states, which would
permit, but not require, stockholders to limit the liability of both direc-
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tors and officers to the corporation or stockholders (but not to third parties) for money damages for any act or omission except for (1) actual
receipt of an improper benefit in money, property or services and (2)
active and deliberate dishonesty that was material to an adjudicated
cause of action.
The subject of this legislation was discussed by the House Judiciary
Committee at a retreat at Deep Creek Lake on September 30 and October 1. The Committee further considered the proposed legislation at a
work session in Annapolis on October 13. Representatives of the State
Insurance Commissioner, the business community and this Subcommittee testified in support of legislation permitting stockholders to limit the
liability of both directors and officers of Maryland corporations. In addition, Kenneth C. Lundeen, a former Chairman of the Section, who was
invited by a member of the Judiciary Committee to present his views as
an independent observer, testified in support of the legislation, including
the addition of officers.
A copy of the bill proposed by the Subcommittee is attached hereto
as [Addendum I]. Relevant portions of the bill are quoted as discussed in
this Report.
The Subcommittee continues to believe strongly that such legislation
is of great importance for the State of Maryland. The Subcommittee also
believes that the legislation is consistent with sound public policy as expressed in decisions of the appellate courts of Maryland, in recent legislative activity in more than 30 other states and in current commentary.
I.

BACKGROUND

In the past two years, the cost of obtaining liability insurance for
directors and officers of corporations throughout the nation has escalated
dramatically. 1 According to the Wall Street Journal (March 21, 1986),
premiums for D&O insurance increased over 360% in one year. Simultaneously, coverage has been reduced through decreased limits, increased
deductibles, narrowed insuring clauses and expanded exclusions. Thus,
the cost of D&O insurance relative to the amount of coverage has soared.
For many companies, the cost of this insurance is simply not affordable
and, indeed, some companies have not been able to obtain quotes at any
price. "Crisis" is not too strong a word to describe the current situation
and has been employed frequently in this context..
This .crisis originated, at least in part, in the general trend toward
higher premiums in liability insurance throughout the country - a trend
which may be attributed to many factors beyond the scope of thi~ Report
1. Insurance against liability of directors and officers of corporations, commonly called
"Directors and Officers Liability Insurance" or "D&O Insurance", is, in fact, two
types of insurance: (1) insurance which covers the directors and officers directly for
any losses incurred by them as directors and officers and (2) insurance which covers
the company against any amounts which it may pay to directors and officers pursuant to its indemnification obligation.
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and which contributed to the passage of Senate Bill 600 (limiting the
liability, in certain situations, of directors of charitable organizations) in
the 1986 session of the General Assembly. More specifically, however,
the current trend in the cost of D&O insurance has probably been influenced by the growing number of lawsuits against directors and officers,
resulting in increased defense costs, settlements and even judgments.
Two areas, in particular, have given rise to an unusually large
number of suits against directors and officers: takeovers and troubled
companies.
Directors are particularly likely to be sued in connection with mergers and takeovers, whether or not "friendly." Because of the high stakes
and the pressures on the board to act quickly, directors face risks of liability almost regardless of whether they vote for or against a takeover.
One notable example is the well-known case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware held
that the directors of Trans Union Corporation could be held liable for
damages approaching $50,000,000 in approving a negotiated merger
without sufficient information and deliberation even though the price was
nearly 50% higher than the recent market price for Trans Union's stock
and even though the investment bankers had been unsuccessful in trying
to obtain a still higher price.
Financially-troubled companies are another frequent source of litigation against directors and officers. In 1984, for example, insurers paid
approximately $25,000,000 - believed to be the largest D&O insurance
payment in history - to settle stockholder suits alleging mismanagement
by former directors and officers of The Wickes Companies.
In Fox v. Chase Manhattan Corporation, No. 8192-85 (Del. Ch. Dec.
6, 1985) (LEXIS, DEL library, Cases file), the Delaware Chancery Court
approved a settlement of $32,500,000 in a suit against Chase Manhattan
Corporation and six of its officers arising out of the collapse of Drysdale
Government Securities, Inc. A few months later, Seafirst Corp., a bank
holding company headquartered in Seattle, and five of its officers agreed
to entry of a judgment against the officers for $110,000,000. American
Banker (July 9, 1986), p. 3. The company agreed to limit its recovery to
the proceeds of the insurance policies covering the officers.
Even doing nothing can be the basis for liability. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held recently that a director who
acquiesces in a breach of fiduciary duty by another director may be held
jointly and severally liable for the breach. Thorn v. Reliance Van Company, Inc., 782 F.2d 1031 (1985) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, USAPP file).
Unfortunately, as the Court in Van Gorkom noted: "It is, of course,
a fact of corporate life that today when faced with difficult or sensitive
issues, directors often are subject to suit, irrespective of the decisions they
make." /d. at 881. Moreover, as another court has recognized, "afterthe-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate business decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily
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reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often
call for quick decisions, inevitably based on less than perfect information." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982).
As a result of these and other cases, some of the few remaining primary D&O insurance carriers began to exclude all activities in the context of hostile takeovers from coverage in new or reissued D&O policies.
Almost immediately, outside directors of many major publicly-held corporations began to resign rather than continue to serve without insurance. The New York Times (March 7, 1986). Most of the resigned
directors have been outsiders. If this trend continues, many publiclyheld corporations will be left with only inside directors - a reversal of
the position which the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New
York Stock Exchange and various commentators have tried to encourage. Corporations will lose a vital source of independent thought
and expertise and the remaining directors will inevitably tend toward
caution and conservatism rather than innovation and the taking of sound
business risks.
Older executives, in particular, with the greatest experience and the
greatest wealth, are unlikely to be willing to risk exposing their personal
assets to the increased hazards of serving as a director. Obviously a
trend which results in reducing the number of qualified outside directors
is poor public policy.
II.

ACTION IN OTHER STATES

Already, several other states have responded legislatively to this predicament. In general, these states have followed one or more of four
approaches:
1. Charter Amendment. In June, 1986, the General Corporation
Law of Delaware (the "Delaware Code") was amended to permit Delaware corporations by charter provision to reduce the liability of directors
for their acts or omissions. The heart of the new legislation, which became effective on July 1, 1986, is a provision amending Section 102(b) of
the Delaware Code to permit, with certain exceptions, a Delaware corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation, either as originally
filed or by an amendment approved by its stockholders, a provision
"eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to a corporation or its stockholders for money damages for breach of fiduciary duty
as a director.... " The statute specifically excepts breaches of the duty of
loyalty, acts not in good faith, intentional misconduct and improper benefit. Several other provisions of the bill amended various subsections of
Section 145 of the Delaware Code dealing with indemnification of directors and officers. Unfortunately, there are questions surrounding the new
law, principally its exceptions which may restrict its efficacy in solving
the problems it purports to address.
Charter option, or enabling, statutes have been adopted by 24 other
. states. The principal difference among the charter option statutes is
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found in their exceptions. Eleven states (Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota and Wyoming) have copied all six of the Delaware exceptions. The
other states (Arkansas, California, Georgia, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah and Washington) have modified these exceptions in whole or in
part.
2. Expanded Indemnifiability. At least nine states- Florida, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin - have enacted statutes expanding the right of
corporations to indemnify their directors for expenses, settlements and
adverse judgments in derivative suits. The typical indemnification statute, as applied to derivative suits, permits the director or officer to be
indemnified only against expenses in the case of a successful defense or a
settlement and permits no indemnification, even for expenses, in the case
of an adverse judgment (unless ordered by a court). Some states permit
indemnification for amounts paid in settlement of derivative actions
while others do not permit such indemnification.
The most far-reaching statutory developments affecting derivative
suits are provisions adopted in four states- Wisconsin, Indiana, North
Carolina and Virginia - eliminating or substantially eliminating the distinction between third-party and derivative suits and permitting indemnification against judgments, settlements and expenses for any director or
officer who meets the general statutory standards for indemnification.
Five other states - Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New York and
Nevada - now permit indemnification against expenses (except in the
case of liability) and settlements.
3. Money Limit on Liability. Virginia, our most vigorous competitor
for business development, has enacted a statute limiting the damages
which may be "assessed against an officer or director" in a suit by or in
the right of the corporation or by the stockholders directly to the lesser
of (1) the amount specified in the charter (or, if approved by the stock- .
holders, in the bylaws) or (2) the greater of (a) $100,000 or (b) "the
amount of cash compensation received by the officer or director from the
corporation during the twelve months immediately preceding the act or
omission for which liability was imposed." 1987 Va. Acts Ch. 257,
amending VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1(A) (Supp. 1987). Thus, if the
shareholders take no action to amend the charter or bylaws, the liability
of a director or officer of a Virginia corporation will be limited to the
greater of $100,000 or his cash compensation over the year preceding the
contested act or omission. The stockholders, however, may reduce (but
not increase) by amendment to the charter or bylaws the $100,000/12month cash compensation limit. Indeed the stockholders may eliminate
monetary liability altogether.
The statute does not apply to "willful misconduct or knowing violation of the criminal law or of any federal or state securities law .... "
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4. Increased Standard of Liability For Money Damages. Four states
-Indiana, Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin- have enacted statutes which
directly alter, without any requirement for stockholder approval, the
standard of liability for imposition of money damages against directors.
Under the new Indiana statute, a director is liable only if he has breached
or failed to perform his duties in compliance with the statutory standard
of care and "the breach or failure to perform constitutes willful misconduct or recklessness." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (Burns Supp.
1987). The Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin statutes have similar exceptions
for egregious misconduct. As noted above, the 1987 bills which were
rejected by the General Assembly followed this approach.
III.

PROPOSALS FOR MARYLAND

The Subcommittee has considered all of the foregoing approaches in
conjunction with its review of the applicable provisions of the Maryland
General Corporation Law ("MGCL"). The Subcommittee believes that
if Maryland does not act (a) directors of many Maryland corporations
will refuse to continue to serve as directors, thus depriving these corporations and their stockholders of some of the most experienced and qualified directors, and/or (b) Maryland will face the loss of many Marylandchartered corporations to other states with more favorable legislation.
Indeed, several Maryland corporations (e.g. Fairchild Industries, Inc.,
Luskin's, Inc., Penta Systems International, Inc. and PUBCO Corporation) have already reincorporated to other states.
With respect to the principal problem of the standard of conduct for
directors, the Subcommittee has concluded that the charter option approach (i.e., permitting the stockholders to limit the liability of directors
and officer for money damages in suits by the corporation or its stockholders) is preferred. Even the stockholders, however, would not be permitted to limit the liability of directors or officers for actual receipt of an
improper personal benefit in money, property or services or for active
and deliberate dishonesty that was material to an adjudicated cause of
action.
The principal Maryland cases on director liability, Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 74, 242 A.2d 512, 540
(1968), and Mountain Manor Realty v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185, 194,
461 A.2d 45, 51 ( 1983), already establish a standard of "gross and culpable negligence" as a prerequisite to money liability for directors. 2 This
judicial standard would continue to apply to corporations, the stockholders of which do not take advantage of the new legislation by approving a
charter amendment limiting the liability of their directors or officers. If,
and only if the stockholders approved, a Maryland corporation could
2. Inexplicably, the Court of Appeals has referred both to "gross and culpable" negligence and "gross or culpable" negligence. Parish, supra, 250 Md. at 74-76, 242
A.2d at 540-41 (1968). See also, Parish v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers
Ass'n, 261 Md. 618, 681, 277 A.2d 19, 48, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
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limit the liability of its directors and officers for all acts or omissions
except, as noted above, for improper personal benefits and active and
deliberate dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that the stockholders, if they so desire, could limit the liability of their directors and
officers to some lesser standard, e.g., gross negligence.
In particular, the Subcommittee believes that this new standard
would have no impact upon truly venal or egregious conduct by selfdealing directors and officers of Maryland corporations. Finally, nothing
in this proposal would in any way affect the right of stockholders under
Section 2-406 to remove directors "with or without cause.... "
The Subcommittee's proposals are discussed in detail below:
1. Charter Option
The Subcommittee proposes that a new paragraph (8) be added to
Section 2-104(b) of the MGCL, that subsection (c) of Section 2-405.1 of
the MGCL be amended and that a new section(§ 2-405.2) be enacted, as
follows:
(b) The articles of incorporation may include:
(1) Any provision not inconsistent with law which defines,
limits, or regulates the powers of the corporation, its directors
and stockholders, any class of its stockholders, or the holders of
any bonds, notes or other securities which it may issue;
(2) Any restriction not inconsistent with law on the transferability of stock of any class;
(3) Any provision authorized by this article to be included
in the bylaws;
(4) Any provision which requires for any purpose the concurrence of a greater proportion of the votes of all classes or of
any class of stock than the proportion required by this article
for that purpose;
(5) A provision which requires for any purpose a lesser
proportion of the votes of all classes or of any class of stock
than the proportion required by this article for that purpose,
but this proportion may not be less than a majority of all the
votes entitled to be cast on the matter;
(6) A provision which divides its directors into classes and
specifies the term of office of each class; [and]
(7) A provision for minority representation through cumulative voting in the election of directors and the terms on which
cumulative voting rights may be exercised[.]; AND
(8) A PROVISION WHICH VARIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH § 2-405.2(A) OF TH.IS TITLE THE STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY OF THE DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS OF A CORPORATION FOR MONEY
DAMAGES.
2-405.1
(c) A person who performs his duties in accordance with
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the standard provided in this section has no liability by reason
of being or having been a director of a corporation [, unless, in
a situation to which § 2-419(d) of this subtitle applies, a contract or transaction is determined not to have been fair and reasonable to the corporation].
2-405.2
(A) THE CHARTER OF THE CORPORATION MAY
INCLUDE ANY PROVISION EXPANDING OR LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS AND OFTO
THE
CORPORATION
OR
ITS
FICERS
STOCKHOLDERS FOR MONEY DAMAGES BUT MAY
NOT INCLUDE ANY PROVISION WHICH RESTRICTS
OR LIMITS THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS OR
OFFICERS TO THE CORPORATION OR ITS
STOCKHOLDERS:
(1) TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS PROVED THAT
THE PERSON ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN IMPROPER
BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES, FOR
THE AMOUNT OF THE BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES ACTUALLY RECEIVED;
(2) TO THE EXTENT THAT A JUDGMENT OR
OTHER FINAL ADJUDICATION ADVERSE TO THE
PERSON IS ENTERED IN A PROCEEDING BASED ON
A FINDING IN THE PROCEEDING THAT THE PERSON'S ACTION, OR FAILURE TO ACT, WAS THERESULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBERATE DISHONESTY
AND WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION
ADJUDICATED IN THE PROCEEDING; OR
(3) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ACTION DESCRIBED
IN SUBSECTION (B) OF THIS SECTION.
(B) THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ACTION BROUGHT BY OR ON BEHALF OF A STATE
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, RECEIVER, CONSERVATOR, OR DEPOSITOR AGAINST A DIRECTOR OR OFFICER OF:
(1) A BANKING INSTITUTION AS DEFINED IN
§ 1-101 OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE;
(2) A CREDIT UNION.... ;
(3) A SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION .. :.:
(4) A SUBSIDIARY OF A BANKING INSTITUTION,
CREDIT UNION, OR SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION DESCRIBED IN THIS SUBSECTION.
(C) THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED TO
AFFECT THE LIABILITY OF A PERSON IN ANY CAPACITY OTHER THAN THE PERSON'S CAPACITY AS
A DIRECTOR OR OFFICER.
The revisions recommended by the Subcommittee reflect the conclu-
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sion that, with respect to the principal issue of directors' and officers'
liability discussed above, the preferred approach is to permit the stockholders to decide for themselves the standard required to impose personal liability for money damages in suits by the corporation or by its
stockholders.
Section 2-405.1(a) of the MGCL provides that a director of a Maryland corporation must perform his duties in "good faith", "[i]n a manner
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation" and
"[w]ith the care [of] an ordinarily prudent person in a like position ...
under' similar circumstances." (This standard of care, which was
adopted by the General Assembly in 1976, follows the standard of care
set forth in Section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
and has been adopted by Indiana, Virginia and several other states.) In
performing these duties, the director is permitted to rely upon legal opinions, financial statements and other reports or information prepared by
officers or employees of the corporation or by outside experts as long as
the director has no "knowledge concerning the matter in question which
would cause such reliance to be unwarranted." MGCL, § 2-405.1(b).
Under current law, if a director performs his duties in accordance
with the tripartite standard of Section 2-405.1 (a), he will have "no liability by reason of being or having been a director of a corporation, unless,
in a situation to which§ 2-419(d) ... applies, a contract or transaction is
determined not to have been fair and reasonable to the corporation." Id.,
§ 2-405.1(c).
The Subcommittee recommends that the stockholders be permitted
to provide, by charter, that directors and officers will not be liable for
money damages in suit by the corporation or the stockholders unless an
act or omission constitutes actual receipt of an improper benefit or active
and deliberate dishonesty. The purpose of setting out the revised liability
standard as a new section is to eliminate any argument that, by its inclusion in Section 2-405.1, the statutory limitation on liability is intended to
apply only to a director's breach of the standard of care set forth in Section 2-405.1(a) and not to a breach of the duty of loyalty.
The proposed Section 2-405.2(a) addresses the liability of directors
and officers for damages only. That is consistent with existing Section 2405.1(c). The protection sought to be provided is intended to limit the
availability of directors' and officers' personal assets as a source for recovery by the corporation or stockholders. It is not intended to affect in
any way the availability of equitable remedies, such as an injunction or
rescission, for a director's violation of his duties or the right of the stockholders to remove a director at any time with or without cause.
The Subcommittee believes that permitting stockholders to decide
whether to limit the liability of directors and officers for money damages
is desirable for several reasons: First, and most importantly, it allows the
owners of the corporation - the stockholders - to decide the issue for
themselves. Second, it follows similar legislative precedents already es-
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tablished in Delaware and 24 other states and will enable Maryland
courts to take advantage of subsequent cases decided in those states
under this standard. Third, it will add greater clarity and certainty to the
law than is available under judicial precedents. Fourth, it will add to the
perception of Maryland as a state with a favorable and responsive climate
to business. Fifth, it will discourage directors and officers of existing
Maryland-chartered publicly-held corporations from recommending
reincorporation in other states by reassuring the directors and officers
that they will not be held personally liable for money damages for simple
negligence. Sixth, newly-established businesses are more likely to incorporate in Maryland to the extent that it is perceived as having an up-todate corporation statute. Finally, enactment of this proposed legislation
will encourage directors of existing Maryland-chartered corporations to
continue to serve s directors.
Failure to enact such legislation is likely to result in (a) the
reincorporation of many Maryland corporations in other states, thus injuring the state's efforts to be perceived as a favorable business climate,
and/or (b) the resignation of directors of Maryland corporations, thus
depriving the stockholders of these corporations (many of whom are
Maryland residents) of some of the most qualified individuals to supervise the managements of these corporations.
Accordingly, the Subcommittee proposes adding a new paragraph
(8) to Section 2-104(b) of the MGCL permitting a charter provision varying the standard for liability for money damages but only to the extent
permitted in subsection (a) of new Section 2-405.2. New Section 2405.2(a) explicitly authorizes eliminating or limiting the liability of directors for money damages except that the charter may not restrict or limit
liability if (1) a director has actually received an improper personal benefit in money, property or services or (2) an adverse judgment establishes
that a director's acts or omissions resulted from active and deliberate
dishonesty and were material to the cause of action.
An exception for improper personal benefit appears in many,
although not all, of the 25 charter option statutes. The Subcommittee
proposes limiting it in the Maryland bill to benefits actually received in
the form of money, property or services in order to eliminate any argument that such ambiguous items as business goodwill or social ingratiation may constitute a benefit to a director or officer. The exception for
"active and deliberate dishonesty" is based upon a similar exclusion appearing in virtually every directors and officers liability insurance policy
and also upon the language of a New York statute enacted last year.
Subsection (a)(3) specifically prohibits the stockholders from limiting the liability of directors or officers with respect to any action brought
by or on behalf of a state governmental entity, receiver, conservator or
depositor against a director or officer of a banking institution, a credit
union, a savings and loan association or a subsidiary of any such entity.
Directors occupy a unique place in the governance of American cor-
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porations. Often, particularly among larger corporations with the most
stockholders, they are outsiders with little or no equity investment of
their own in the corporation; yet they are charged with protecting the
investments of thousands, sometimes hundreds of thousands, of stockholders, in Maryland and elsewhere. Their compensation is insignificant
relative to the magnitude of their risks and responsibilities. Generally, it
is a part-time position. Indeed, some of the individuals most sought as
corporate directors are senior executive officers of other corporations
who can bring a wide range of experience and knowledge to the
corporation.
The Subcommittee believes that inclusion of officers in the proposed
legislation is particularly important:
First, many of the decisions and transactions which are submitted to
a Board of Directors originate among the officers and, if approved by the
Board, are referred to the officers for implementation. They are entitled,
if the stockholders so decide, to be protected to the same degree as
officers.
Second, unlike the 1987 bills, the proposed 1988 bill permits the
stockholders to decide the issue of limitation of liability. Under the proposed bill, the stockholders would be able to limit the liability of directors alone, officers alone, both or neither.
Third, the 1987 bills did not limit the liability of directors to suits by
the corporation or its stockholders. The proposed 1988 bill is expressly
limited solely to suits by the corporation or its stockholders. It would not
include suits by third parties. Thus, the only claimants whose rights
would be affected by a limitation on the liability of directors and officers
would be the stockholders, and then only with their approval.
Fourth, there is no logical policy reason for permitting stockholders
to limit the liability of directors but not permitting them to limit the
liability of officers. Moreover, treating directors and officers alike for
purposes of permitting their liability to be limited is consistent with the
identical treatment of directors and officers under the indemnification
provisions of Section 2-418 of the MGCL. It would be inconsistent for
directors and officers to be working together on evaluating, negotiating
or implementing a major corporate transaction for which the directors'
liability could be limited and the officers' liability could not.
Fifth, directors and officers liability insurers are more likely to reduce their premiums if they are assured that the liability of both directors
and officers has been limited. Since most D&O insurance policies cover
both directors and officers, the liability of an officer could result in a
claim against the insurance company even though the directors' liability
had been limited.
Sixth, the recently-enacted Virginia statute, discussed above, applies
to both directors and officers. One Baltimore-based Maryland-chartered
corporation has already reincorporated in Virginia, another has indicated
in a proxy statement that it may reincorporate there and other corpora-
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tions incorporated in other states have also reincorporated in Virginia.
Other states, e.g., New Jersey, have also enacted legislation authorizing
limits on the liability of officers as well as directors.
Finally, permitting stockholders to decide whether to decide
whether to limit the liability of both officers and directors enhances the
role of the stockholders incorporate governance. The stockholders are
already charged with the duty of voting on mergers, charter amendments, election of directors and other significant corporate acts. Permitting the stockholders to decide for themselves whether to limit the
liability of officers in addition to directors is not only consistent and
sound public policy, as indicated above, but broadens the right of the
stockholders to determine for themselves the best interest for the corporations they own.
Section 2-405.1(c) is amended by eliminating the reference to Section 2-419. Section 2-419 provides alternative means of insulating from
voidness or voidability transactions between a corporation and a director;
it does not provide for personal liability for directors. Accordingly, the
reference to Section 2-419 in Section 2-405.1 (c) is inappropriate and
should be deleted. Section 8.30(d) of the Model Act- the counterpart
to Section 2-405.1(c) -contains no similar reference to the counterpart
of Section 2-419.
2. Change in Standards for Indemnification
Section 2-418(b)(1) currently sets forth the "good faith", "reasonable belief" standards which a director or officer3 must satisfy in order to
be entitled to indemnification. The Subcommittee recommends amending Section 2-418(b)(1) to permit a corporation to indemnify a director
unless it is proved that the individual (1) acted in bad faith or with active
and deliberate dishonesty, (2) actually received an improper personal
benefit in money, property or services or (3) in the case of a criminal
proceeding had reasonable cause to believe that his act or omission was
unlawful:
(b)(1) A corporation may indemnify any director made a
party to any proceeding by reason of service in that capacity [if
the director:
(i) Acted in good faith;
(ii) Reasonably believed:
1. In the case of conduct in the director's official capacity
with the corporation, that the conduct was in the best interests
of the corporation; and
2. In all other cases, that the conduct was at least not opposed to the best interests of the corporation; and]
UNLESS IT IS PROVED THAT:
3. As noted above, Section 2-418(j)(l) provides that, unless the charter provides otherwise, an officer "shall be indemnified as and to the extent provided . . . for a
director .... "
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(I) THE ACT OR OMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR
WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION ADJUDICATED IN THE PROCEEDING: AND
1. WAS COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH; OR
2. WAS THE RESULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBERATE DISHONESTY; OR
(II) THE DIRECTOR ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN
IMPROPER PERSONAL BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES; OR
(III) In the case of any criminal proceeding, THE DIRECTOR HAD [no] reasonable cause to believe that the [conduct]
ACT OR OMISSION was unlawful.
Expanding the right of the corporation to indemnify its directors
and officers is consistent with statutory amendments enacted by numerous other states. It should be noted that, as in the case of limitation of
liability, the proposed bill would merely permit, not require, the corporation to act.
3. Expansion of Indemnification in Derivative Suits
Section 2-418(b)(2)(ii) currently provides that, in a derivative suit,
indemnification may only be made against reasonable expenses and may
not be made, even for expenses, if the individual has been adjudged to be
liable to the corporation. The Subcommittee recommends deleting the
limitation of indemnification in derivative suits to reasonable expenses in
order to permit a director to be indemnified for settlements of derivative
suits:
(2)(i) Indemnification may be against judgments, penalties,
fines, settlements; and reasonable expenses actually incurred by
the director in connection with the proceeding.
(ii) However, if the proceeding was one by or in the right
of the corporation, indemnification [may be made only against
reasonable expenses and] may not be made in respect of any
proceeding in which the director shall have been adjudged to be
liable to the corporation.
This change will encourage settlements by permitting indemnification for
amounts paid in settlement and not just for expenses. In addition, as
noted below, as a result of the expansion of the language of Section 2418(g), relating to non-exclusivity, it is no longer necessary to limit indemnification in derivative suits to reasonable expenses.
4. Changes in Indemnification Procedures
The Subcommittee recommends the following four amendments to
Section 2-418 of the MGCL relating to the procedures for
indemnification:

Presumption of Non-Compliance (Section 2-418(b)(3))
(b)(3) (I) The termination of any proceeding by judgment, order,
OR settlement [, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its
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equivalent creates a rebuttable] DOES NOT CREATE A presumption
that the director did not meet the requisite standard of conduct set forth
in this subsection.
(II) THE TERMINATION OF ANY PROCEEDING BY CONVICTION ON A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE OR ITS
EQUIVALENT CREATES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
THAT THE DIRECTOR DID NOT MEET THAT STANDARD OF
CONDUCT.
Section 2-418(b)(3) currently provides that termination of any proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction or a nolo contendere
plea creates a rebuttable presumption that the director did not meet the
requisite standard of conduct set forth in Section 2-418(b)(l). The Subcommittee recommends that, as to convictions and nolo contendere pleas,
a rebuttable presumption should continue but that, as to judgments, orders and settlements, there should be no presumption one way or the
other.
Read literally, the termination of a proceeding by a judgment of no
liability presently creates a rebuttable presumption that the director did
not meet the requisite standard of conduct. While the Subcommittee believes that such a result would be overridden by the requirement of indemnification in subsection (d)(l), it is at least superficially inconsistent
with that subsection.
The problem with Section 2-418(b)(3) as it currently reads is most
acute in the case of settlements. A settlement may be the result of many
factors other than an assessment of the likelihood of liability. For example, a suit may be settled for its ..nuisance" value at an amount less than
the cost to the corporation of litigating to a successful conclusion. It is
difficult to imagine, therefore, why a settlement should create a presumption of non-compliance with the standards of Section 2-418(b)(l).
As a matter of public policy, settlements are to be encouraged as a
means of terminating litigation, and it is against public policy to discourage settlements by providing that corporate officers and directors may
lose their indemnification unless they pursue all litigation to its ultimate
conclusion.
The Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Section 8.51(c)) and
the new Virginia Stock Corporation Act (Section 13.1-697(C)) both specifically provide that a judgment, settlement or other termination of the
proceeding does not create a presumption that the director did not meet
the requisite standard of care. Likewise, Section 145(a) of the Delaware
statute provides:
The termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment,
order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere
or its equivalent, shall not, of itself, create a presumption that
the person did not act in good faith and in a manner which he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests
of the corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or
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proceeding, had reasonable cause to believe that his conduct
was unlawful.
(Emphasis added.) The statutes of 41 other states are similar. Maryland
is the only state in which a settlement creates a presumption that the
director did not meet the requisite standard of care. Members of the
Subcommittee are personally aware of many situations in which counsel
to Maryland-chartered corporations (including counsel located in other
states) have expressed surprise and apprehension about the presumption
of non-compliance in Section 2-418(b)(1 ).
The revisions recommended by the Subcommittee are based largely
upon Section 145(a) of the Delaware statute. However, the phrase "of
itself" appearing in the Delaware statute (as well as in the Model Act
and most other state statutes) has been deleted because it was felt that
this phrase suggested the possibility that the termination of the proceeding could be combined with some other fact to create a presumption.
The Subcommittee believes that all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the termination should be available as evidence, subject to the
usual evidentiary rules, but that no presumption should be created.
Non-Exclusivity (Section 2-418(g))
(g) [A provision for the corporation to indemnify a director who is made a party to a proceeding, whether contained in]
THE INDEMNIFICATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
EXPENSES PROVIDED OR AUTHORIZED BY THIS
SECTION MAY NOT BE DEEMED EXCLUSIVE OF ANY
OTHER RIGHTS, BY INDEMNIFICATION OR OTHERWISE, TO WHICH A DIRECTOR MAY BE ENTITLED
UNDER the charter, the bylaws, a resolution of stockholders
or directors, an agreement or otherwise, [except as contemplated by subsection (k) of this section, is not valid unless consistent with this section or, to the extent that indemnity under
this section is limited by the charter, consistent with the charter] BOTH AS TO ACTION IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AND AS TO ACTION IN ANOTHER CAPACITY WHILE
HOLDING SUCH OFFICE.
Under current Section 2-418(g), any contract between a corporation
and its directors providing for indemnification must be "consistent with"
the indemnification permitted by Section 2-418.
This provision is much more restrictive than the comparable provision in Delaware, Section 145(f), which provides that the indemnification provided by state "shall not be deemed exclusive of any other rights
to which those seeking indemnification may be entitled under any bylaw,
agreement, ... or otherwise .... " Thus, Maryland's Section 2-418(g) is
a limitation upon indemnification while Delaware's Section 145(f) is a
non-exclusive provision for indemnification. Approximately 30 other
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states and the District of Columbia have non-exclusivity provisions substantially similar to Delaware's.
Even the Delaware statute, however, could be read to limit any indemnification right to Section 145, although "other rights" would not be
deemed to be excluded by Section 145.
Current Section 2-418(g) is based upon Section 8.58(a) of the Revised Model Act. The Official Comment to Section 8.58(a) notes that the
non-exclusive statutory provisions, such as Delaware's, make "no attempt to limit the nonstatutory creation of rights of indemnification.
This kind of language is subject to misconstruction ... since nonstatutory conceptions of public policy limit the power of the corporation to
indemnify or to contract to indemnify directors.... " Significantly, however, the Official Comment also notes that the phrase
"to the extent it is consistent with" is not synonymous with
"exclusive." Situations may well develop from time to time in
which indemnification is permissible under Section 8.58 but
would be precluded if all portions of [the indemnification statute] were viewed as exclusive.
Kentucky follows the 1980 version of the Model Act in its indemnification provision, except for its non-exclusivity provision, which follows
the Delaware statute.
The purpose of the revisions to Section 2-418(g) is to make clear
that any rights, by indemnification or otherwise, to which a director may
be entitled are not precluded by Section 2-418. Of course, the "other
rights" referred to in Section 2-418(g) would be limited by public policy
considerations.
The revisions recommended by the Subcommittee are based largely
upon Section 145(f) of the Delaware statute. However, the phrase
"those seeking indemnification" has been replaced with the words "a director" in order to clarify that a person need not seek indemnification in
order to have the benefit of the non-exclusivity provision of new Section
2-418(g).
By virtue of Section 2-4180), the proposed non-exclusivity provision
would also apply to officers, employees and agents as well as to directors.

Determination of Permissibility of Indemnification (Section 2418(e))

(e) (1) Indemnification under subsection (b) of this section
may not be made by the corporation unless authorized [in the
specific case] FOR A SPECIFIC PROCEEDING after a determination has been made that indemnification of the director is
permissible in the circumstances because the director has met
the standard of conduct set forth in subsection (b) of this
section.
Section 2-418(e) currently provides that indemnification must be
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"authorized in the specific case.... " The word "case" is nowhere defined in Section 2-418 and its use, especially in view of the fact that the
word "proceeding" is defined, frequently raises the question of whether
indemnification for each bill for expenses in connection with a proceeding must be separately authorized after each submission for expenses to
be paid in advance under subsection (f). This interpretation could lead
to repeated and unnecessary reexamination of the same issue and the
same circumstances each time expenses are incurred, at excessive cost to
the corporation. The substitution of the phrase "for a specific proceeding" for the phrase "in the specific case" solves this problem.

Advance Payment of Expenses (Section 2-418(/))
(f)(1) Reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a
party to a proceeding may be paid or reimbursed by the corporation in advance of the final disposition of the proceeding [,
after a determination that the facts then known to those making the determination would not preclude ind~mnification
under this section,] upon receipt by the corporation of:
(i) A written affirmation by the director of the director's
good faith belief that the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification by the corporation as authorized in this section
has been met; and
(ii) A written undertaking by or on behalf of the director
to repay the amount if it shall ultimately be determined that the
standard of conduct has not been met.
(2) The undertaking required by subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be an unlimited general obligation of the director but need not be secured and may be
accepted without reference to financial ability to make the
repayment.
(3) [Determinations and authorizations of payments]
PAYMENTS under this subsection shall be [in the manner]
MADE AS PROVIDED BY THE CHARTER, BYLAWS,
OR CONTRACT OR AS specified in subsection (e) of this
section.
Section 2-418(f) currently requires, as a prerequisite to advance payment of expenses, a determination in e~ch case that indemnification
would not be precluded under the facts known at the time of the determination. The proposed revisions would eliminate the necessity for this
determination.
Instead, a corporation could adopt a general provision for advance
payment of expenses in its charter or bylaws or by contract. Alternatively, a corporation could still advance expenses pursuant to a determination under Section 2-418(e) "that indemnification is permissible in the
circumstances because the director has met the standard of conduct set
forth in subsection (b) .... " In either case, advance payment of expenses
could be made only upon receipt of (a) a written affirmation of the direc-
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tor's good faith belief that he met the standard of conduct for indemnification and (b) a written undertaking to repay if it is ultimately
determined that the standard of conduct was not met.
The proposed revision follows closely the amendment recently enacted in Delaware. The amendment would allow Maryland corporations
the same flexibility in administering these matters as Delaware
corporations.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Subcommittee wishes to reemphasize its unanimous view that
legislation in these areas is essential in order to provide a sound response
by the State of Maryland to problems that have truly reached crisis proportions. In addition, we believe that this legislation will contribute to a
perception of Maryland as a state with a favorable and responsible climate for new and established businesses. This legislation, we believe,
represents sound fundamental public policy and not merely a short-term
reaction of undue alarm or an effort to prevent migration of Maryland
corporations out of state at any cost. The basic elements of the proposed
legislation have been reviewed and approved by the full Committee on
Corporate Laws. Respectfully submitted,
James J. Hanks, Jr., Chairman
Arthur F. Fergenson
Arthur W. Machen, Jr.
Larry P. Scriggins
J. W. Thompson Webb
John J. Woloszyn
Dated: November 16, 1987
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ADDENDUM I
WILLIAM DONALD SCHAEFER, Governor
CHAPTER 3
(House Bill 273)
AN ACT concerning
Corporations and Associations Standard of Liability and Indemnification
FOR the purpose of authorizing a corporate charter to alter the
standard for imposing liability for damages on corporate directors
and officers; providing for certain exceptions; modifying the presumptions applicable to, and the procedures for establishing the basis for, indemnification and advancement of expenses to corporate
directors and certain other persons; providing for the application
and construction of certain provisions of this Act; generally relating
to the standards for liability for corporate directors and officers and
indemnification of corporate directors and certain other persons;
and making this Act an emergency measure.
BY adding to
Article - Corporations and Associations
Section 2-405.2
Annotated Code of Maryland
(1985 Replacement Volume and 1987 Supplement)
BY repealing and reenacting, with amendments,
Article - Corporations and Associations
Section 2-104(b), 2-405.1(c), and 2-418(b), (e)(1), (f), (g), and
(k)
Annotated Code of Maryland
(1985 Replacement Volume and 1987 Supplement)
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:
Article - Corporations and Associations
2-104.
(b)

The articles of incorporation may include:

EXPLANATION: CAPITALS INDICATE MATTER ADDED TO EXISTING LAW; [Brackets] indicate matter deleted from existing law.
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(1) Any provision not inconsistent with law which defines,
limits, or regulates the powers of the corporation, its directors and stockholders, any class of its stockholders, or the holders of any bonds, notes,
or other securities which it may issue;
(2) Any restriction not inconsistent· with law on the transferability of stock of any class;
(3) Any provision authorized by this article to be included in
the bylaws;
(4) Any provision which requires for any purpose the concurrence of a greater proportion of the votes of all classes or of any class of
stock than the proportion required by this article for that purpose;
(5) A provision which requires for any purpose a lesser proportion of the votes of all classes or of any class of stock than the proportion required by this article for that purpose, but this proportion may not
be less than a majority of all the votes entitled to be cast on the matter;
(6) A provision which divides its directors into classes and
specifies the term of office of each class; [and]
(7) A provision for minority representation through cumulative voting in the election of directors and the terms on which cumulative
voting rights may be exercised; AND
(8) A PROVISION WHICH VARIES IN ACCORDANCE
WITH § 2-405.2(A) OF THIS TITLE THE STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY OF THE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF A CORPORATION FOR MONEY DAMAGES.
2-405.1.
(c) A person who performs his duties in accordance with the standard provided in this section has no liability by reason of being or having
been a director of a corporation[, unless, in a situation to which § 2419(d) of this subtitle applies, a contract or transaction is determined not
to have been fair and reasonable to the corporation].
2-405.2.
(A) THE CHARTER OF THE CORPORATION MAY INCLUDE ANY PROVISION EXPANDING OR LIMITING THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS TO THE
CORPORATION OR ITS STOCKHOLDERS FOR MONEY DAMAGES BUT MAY NOT INCLUDE ANY PROVISION WHICH RESTRICTS OR LIMITS THE LIABILITY OF ITS DIRECTORS OR
OFFICERS TO THE CORPORATION OR ITS STOCKHOLDERS:
(1) TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS PROVED THAT THE
PERSON ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN IMPROPER BENEFIT OR
PROFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES, FOR THE
AMOUNT OF THE BENEFIT OR PROFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR SERVICES ACTUALLY RECEIVED;
(2) TO THE EXTENT THAT A JUDGMENT OR OTHER
FINAL ADJUDICATION ADVERSE TO THE PERSON IS ENTERED IN A PROCEEDING BASED ON A FINDING IN THE
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PROCEEDING T.HAT THE PERSON'S ACTION, OR FAILURE
TO ACT, WAS THE RESULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBERATE
DISHONESTY AND WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION ADJUDICATED IN THE PROCEEDING; OR
(3) WITH RESPECT TO ANY ACTION DESCRIBED IN
SUBSECTION (B) OF THIS SECTION.
(B) THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ACTION
BROUGHT BY OR ON BEHALF OF A STATE GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITY, RECEIVER, CONSERVATOR, OR DEPOSITOR
AGAINST A DIRECTOR OR OFFICER OF:
(1) A BANKING INSTITUTION AS DEFINED IN § 1101 OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE;
(2) A CREDIT UNION AS DESCRIBED IN § 6-201 OF
THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE;
(3) A SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION AS DEFINED IN § 8-101 OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARTICLE; OR
(4) A SUBSIDIARY OF A BANKING INSTITUTION,
CREDIT UNION, OR SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION DESCRIBED IN THIS SUBSECTION.
(C) THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE CONSTRUED TO AFFECT THE LIABILITY OF A PERSON IN ANY CAPACITY
OTHER THAN THE PERSON'S CAPACITY AS A DIRECTOR OR
OFFICER.
2-418.
(b)(1) A corporation may indemnify any director made a party to
any proceeding by reason of service in that capacity [if the director:
(i)
(ii)

Acted in good faith;
Reasonably believed:

1. In the case of conduct in the director's official capacity with the corporation, that the conduct was in the best interests of
the corporation; and
2. In all other cases, that the conduct was at least
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation; and] UNLESS IT IS
PROVED THAT:
(I) THE ACT OR OMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR
WAS MATERIAL TO THE CAUSE OF ACTION ADJUDICATED
IN THE PROCEEDING; AND
1. WAS COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH; OR
2. WAS THE RESULT OF ACTIVE AND DELIBERATE DISHONESTY; OR
(II) THE DIRECTOR ACTUALLY RECEIVED AN
IMPROPER PERSONAL BENEFIT IN MONEY, PROPERTY, OR
SERVICES; OR
(iii) In the case of any criminal proceeding, THE DI-
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RECTOR had [no] reasonable cause to believe that the [conduct] ACT
OR OMISSION was unlawful.
(2)(i) Indemnification may be against judgments, penalties,
fines, settlements, and reasonable expenses actually incurred by the director in connection with the proceeding.
(ii) However, if the proceeding was one by or in the right
of the corporation, indemnification [may be made only against reasonable
expenses and] may not be made in respect of any proceeding in which the
director shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation.
(3)(1) The termination of any proceeding by judgment, order
OR settlement[, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its
equivalent creates a rebuttable] DOES NOT CREATE A presumption
that the director did not meet the requisite standard of conduct set forth
in this subsection.
(II) THE TERMINATION OF ANY PROCEEDING
BY CONVICTION, OR A PLEA OF NOLO CONTENDERE OR ITS
EQUIVALENT, OR AN ENTRY OF AN ORDER OF PROBATION
PRIOR TO JUDGMENT, CREATES A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION THAT THE DIRECTOR DID NOT MEET THAT STANDARD OF CONDUCT.
(e)(l) Indemnification under subsection (b) of this section may not
be made by the corporation unless authorized [in the specific case] FOR
A SPECIFIC PROCEEDING after a determination has been made that
indemnification of the director is permissible in the circumstances because the director has met the standard of conduct set forth in subsection
(b) of this section.
(f)(l) Reasonable expenses incurred by a director who is a party to
a proceeding may be paid or reimbursed by the corporation in advance of
the final disposition of the proceeding[, after a determination that the
facts then known to those making the determination would not preclude
indemnification under this section,] upon receipt by the corporation of:
(i) A written affirmation by the director of the director's
good faith belief that the standard of conduct necessary for indemnification by the corporation as authorized in this section has been met; and
(ii) A written undertaking by or on behalf of the director
to repay the amount if it shall ultimately be determined that the standard
of conduct has not been met.
(2) The undertaking required by subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be an unlimited general obligation of
the director but need not be secured and may be accepted without reference to financial ability to make the repayment.
(3) [Determinations and authorizations of payments] PAYMENTS under this subsection shall be [in the manner] MADE AS PROVIDED BY THE CHARTER, BYLAWS, OR CONTRACT OR AS
specified in subsection (e) of this section.
(g) [A provision for the corporation to indemnify a director who is
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made a party to a proceeding, whether contained in] THE INDEMNIFICATION AND ADVANCEMENT OF EXPENSES PROVIDED OR
AUTHORIZED BY THIS SECTION MAY NOT BE DEEMED EXCLUSIVE OF ANY OTHER RIGHTS, BY INDEMNIFICATION
OR OTHERWISE, TO WHICH A DIRECTOR MAY BE ENTITLED
UNDER the charter, the bylaws, a resolution of stockholders or directors, an agreement or otherwise, [except as contemplated by subsection
(k) of this section, is not valid unless consistent with this section or, to
the extent that indemnity under this section is limited by the charter,
consistent with the charter] BOTH AS TO ACTION IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND AS TO ACTION IN ANOTHER CAPACITY WHILE HOLDING SUCH OFFICE.
(k)(l) A corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, officer, employee, or agent of
the corporation, or who, while a director, officer, employee, or agent of
the corporation, is or was serving at the request of the corporation as a
director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or agent of another foreign
or domestic corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust, other enterprise, or employee benefit plan against any liability asserted against and
incurred by such person in any such capacity or arising out of such person's position, whether or not the corporation would have the power to
indemnify against liability under the provisions of this section.
(2) A CORPORATION MAY PROVIDE SIMILAR PROTECTION, INCLUDING A TRUST FUND, LETTER OF CREDIT,
OR SURETY BOND, NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS
SECTION.
(3) THE INSURANCE OR SIMILAR PROTECTION
MAY BE PROVIDED BY A SUBSIDIARY OR AN AFFILIATE OF
THE CORPORATION.
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That the provisions of§§ 2-104(b)(8) and 2-405.2 of the Corporations and Associations Article added by this Act shall apply only to actions arising from
events or omissions occurring on or after the effective date of this Act,
and that, except as provided in Section 3 of this Act, the amendments to
§ 2-418 of the Corporations and Associations Article added by this Act
shall apply only to indemnification granted on or after the effective date
of this Act, whether the events, omissions, or proceedings underlying the
indemnification occurred before or after the effective date of this Act.
SECTION 3. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That with respect to a banking institution, credit union, or savings and loan association described in this Act, or a subsidiary of a banking institution, credit
union, or savings and loan association described in this Act, the amendments to Section 2-418 of the Corporations and Associations Article added by this Act shall apply only to indemnification granted on or after
the effective date of this Act for events, omissions or proceedings occurring after the effective date of this Act.
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SECTION 4. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act
is an emergency measure, is necessary for the immediate preservation of
the public health and safety, has been passed by a yea and nay vote supported by three-fifths of all the members elected to each of the two
Houses of the General Assembly, and shall take effect from the date it is
enacted.
Approved February 18, 1988.

